A Handshake Protocol With Unbalanced Cost for Wireless Updating by Cai, Jiaren et al.
Received February 3, 2018, accepted March 10, 2018, date of publication March 27, 2018, date of current version April 23, 2018.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2820086
A Handshake Protocol With Unbalanced
Cost for Wireless Updating
JIAREN CAI 1, XIN HUANG 1, JIE ZHANG 1, JIAWEI ZHAO2, YAXI LEI 1,
DAWEI LIU1, AND XIAOFENG MA3
1Department of Computer Science and Software Engineering, Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, Suzhou 215123, China
2International Business School Suzhou, Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, Suzhou 215123, China
3Department of Control Science and Engineering, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China
Corresponding author: Xin Huang (xin.huang@xjtlu.edu.cn)
This work was supported in part by the Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 61701418, in part by the Natural Science
Foundation of China under Grant 61701417, in part by the CERNET under Grant NGII20161010, in part by the Jiangsu Province National
Science Foundation under Grant BK20150376, in part by the Suzhou Science and Technology Development Plan under
Grant SYG201516, and in part by XJTLU under Grant RDF140243 and Grant RDF150246
ABSTRACT Wireless updating is an essential method to update system files or fix bugs in Internet of
Things (IoT) devices. A significant and challenging problem in wireless updating is security. First, without
security guarantees, attackers can utilize the updating procedure to install harmful programs into the victim
devices. Second, it is challenging to provide security for wireless updating, since in many IoT scenarios,
the devices to be updated are computationally limited devices and located far from the center that issues
update files. Currently, there are two types of solution to protect the wireless updating. The first one is the
transport layer security (TLS) protocol or secure sockets layer (SSL) protocol that are used by wireless
updating schemes for mobile terminals with the following operation systems: Windows, Debian, Android,
and iOS. Another solution is the elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH)-based handshake in the software-
defined function (SDF) wireless updating scheme for the IoT devices. However, both the two solutions
require equal computation tasks on the update file issuing center and the device to be updated. Normally,
the former is much powerful than the latter. Therefore, to further address the security problem in wireless
updating, we propose a novel solution with unbalanced computation costs on the two parties. In particular,
we design an improved ECDH-based handshake protocol for the SDF wireless updating scheme, namely,
the unbalanced OpenFunction handshake protocol. The protocol transfers significant computation task from
the limited IoT device to the powerful center. The security of the protocol is analyzed. A prototype is realized
to test the performance of the protocol. The experiment results show that in the same experimental platform,
our protocol is much lightweight than the TLS handshake protocol and SSL handshake protocol.
INDEX TERMS Internet of Things, wireless updating, secure sockets layer, transport layer security, software
defined function, unbalanced OpenFunction handshake.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) is the network of a variety of devices
that can automatically interact with each other and cooperate
with their neighbors to achieve common goals [1]. The IoT
technology is considered to be incorporated into the products
and servers of a wide range of industry sectors such as health-
care, automotive, manufacturing, consumer electronics and
home [2].
In many IoT systems, wireless updating is a significant
method for IoT devices to receive system files from remote
servers. Through remote system updates, those devices
employed in practical application scenes obtain new func-
tions and fix security vulnerabilities and bugs wirelessly.
To our knowledge, there are several wireless updating
schemes. Many mainstream laptop operating systems, such
as Windows and Debian [3], [4], implement Secure Sockets
Layer protocol (SSL) to finish handshake with servers
to achieve wireless system updating. Besides, iOS system
applies SSL and Android system utilizes Transport Layer
Security Protocol (TLS) to furnish device firmware update
for their mobile devices [5], [6]. Furthermore, for IoT appli-
cations, [7] ensures security ofWireless Multimedia Delivery
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with error-resilient encoder and decoder, which processes
authentication and watermarking in encoder and verifica-
tion in decoder. In addition, a protocol called OpenFunc-
tion [8], [9] has also proposed a feasible scheme based on
Software Defined Function (SDF). Unlike [7] employing
decoder to reduce cost of code error, OpenFunction authen-
ticates and verifies Message Authentication Code (MAC)
to guarantee security of session key agreement. According
to this protocol, some IoT devices which act as function
stations or local centers are enabled to securely initiate wire-
less connectionswith their remote servers to accept the update
files. Then, these function stations utilize the update files to
reprogram IoT end devices like sensors through many strate-
gies [10]–[15] in Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) or Perva-
sive Social Network (PSN).
In above schemes, the security of update files is guaran-
teed by their handshake process. Handshake process is an
important step in both SSL and TLS, which is to verify certifi-
cates, agree on session keys and establish trusted connec-
tions between servers and devices. The handshake processes
in these schemes require participants engaging on two sides
to execute authentication with equivalent computation tasks.
In fact, it is [9] notable that the computing capacity of these
two sides, like function stations and servers, are different.
Especially in the scenes of OpenFunction protocol, func-
tion stations build secure connections with controllers, i.e.
servers, by OpenFunction handshake to ensure the authen-
tication of update files. However, most function stations are
less powerful than their servers. The OpenFunction protocol
neglects this problem and fails to take advantage of powerful
servers to achieve higher efficiency in handshake. Moreover,
it might overburden some weak function stations. Therefore,
in this paper, we aim to increase efficiency of OpenFunction
handshake by way of reducing the computational load on
function stations.
In this paper, we will propose an improved protocol of
the OpenFunction handshake protocol. We consider func-
tion stations as middle devices and regard remote servers
as controllers. With shifting some computing tasks from
middle devices to controllers, the proposed protocol allocates
unbalanced computation in authentication of these both sides.
In addition, the security of authentication will not be affected
by the shift. Thus, this design reduces the computing cost of
function stations and minimizes the risk of overload. In addi-
tion, we will design a prototype for this protocol. The main
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• The design of unbalanced computation on middle
devices and controllers is applied in the OpenFunc-
tion protocol for the first time. This design reduces the
burden of those devices that possess low computing
power, so as to improve the protocol’s efficiency and
avoid to overload middle devices. Moreover, after
comparing experiment results, the proposed protocol
enables devices to complete handshake much faster
than handshake of SSL and TLS. The protocol’s total
computing time in device and server is also shorter
FIGURE 1. Handshake process of OpenFunction protocol in SDF [9].
than those of SSL and TLS. Therefore, by using unbal-
anced computation design, the unbalanced OpenFunc-
tion protocol is more efficient than SSL and TLS.
• The protocol improves the handshake in former Open-
Function with fewer steps. Instead of seven communi-
cation steps of the predecessor [9] (as shown in Fig.1),
this protocol completes the OpenFunction handshake by
only four steps. Thus, the protocol can finish handshake
faster than its predecessor.
• The Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) algorithm is
firstly utilized in SDF framework. This algorithm can
ensure the security of authentication during Open-
Function handshake. By employing ECC algorithm,
the secret key stored in two sides is much shorter than
that of RSA in same encryption strength. Moreover, this
protocol requires no secret key before running.
In the rest of this paper, Section 2 illuminates the back-
ground about the SDF and the OpenFunction protocol.
Section 3 introduces the knowledge related to ECC algorithm
and the symbols used in this paper. The unbalanced
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FIGURE 2. Logical view of SDF architecture.
OpenFunction protocol is described in Section 4. The secu-
rity analysis of the protocol is demonstrated in Section 5.
The performance of the advised protocol is theoretically
evaluated by analyzing its experiment results in Section 6.
The comparison between the proposed protocols and other
actual remote system update approaches is listed in Section 7.
Furthermore, Section 8 displays a use case of this improved
protocol. Finally, the conclusion of this paper is drawn
in Section 9.
II. BACKGROUND
Ourwork is to improve theOpenFunction handshake protocol
in SDF. Therefore, we briefly review SDF and OpenFunction
in this section.
A. SDF
Fig.2 shows a logical view of SDF. It is divided into three
layers from top to bottom: application layer, control layer, and
infrastructure layer. In SDF, the controller in the control layer
sends update files to the middle device in the infrastructure
layer. With the update files, the middle device reprograms the
end devices. Therefore, securing communication between the
control and infrastructure layers is a core requirement of SDF.
It determines whether the end devices can be reprogrammed
properly.
B. OPENFUNCTION
The OpenFunction is a security protocol suit between the
control and infrastructure layers. Its security is based on
handshake process, which is the OpenFunction handshake
protocol in [9]. The OpenFunction handshake protocol
authenticates the controller and middle device, and estab-
lishes a shared session key between them. The shared key
is used to provide security of update files. Fig.1 provides a
general overview of this protocol’s handshake process.
As we mentioned before, middle device is much less
powerful compared with the controller. The OpenFunction
handshake protocol requires the same computing cost on
them. It is better to reduce the cost on the middle device.
In addition, some communications in the protocol are not
necessary to handshake. In the following section, we will
improve the protocol and design a new handshake protocol
that is better than [9] in terms of the following aspects:
• Unbalanced computation tasks in middle device and
controller.
• Fewer number of communication steps for handshake.
C. CHALLENGES AND NECESSITIES OF UNBALANCED
COMPUTING COST
Many IoT middle devices have very limited computational
power. Executing same computing work requires longer time
in these limited devices than in IoT controllers and other
powerful devices. When multiple operations execute in a
short time, end devices might be influenced by high computa-
tional load. The schemes applied unbalanced computing cost
can reduce computational burden on the limited devices and
shorten runtime.
Furthermore, in some scenarios, many IoT middle devices
are only powered by batteries. Unbalanced cost schemes can
allocate less computing works on end devices by diverting
to powerful devices and demand lower energy cost. Thus,
battery replacement frequency of end devices can be longer
than usual.
Additionally, unbalanced cost schemes lower the require-
ment of IoT middle devices’ computing power in some appli-
cations. Users can deploy more lightweight, cheaper and
smaller hardware chips in end devices.
III. PRELIMINARIES AND SYMBOLS
This section introduces ECC algorithm and security model
for the improved protocol. Symbols used in the rest part of
this paper are summarized in Table 1.
A. ELLIPTIC CURVE PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange [16] of the elliptic curve
public key cryptography (ECC) is essential in the unbalanced
OpenFunction protocol. Here we briefly introduce the related
knowledge.
1) ELLIPTIC CURVE
Suppose that (x,y) is a point on the elliptic curve; a and b are
coefficients; p is an odd prime; and GF(p) is a prime finite
field. An elliptic curve can be described by the following
formula [17], [18]:
y2 ≡ x3 + ax + b mod p
with a, b ∈ GF(p), 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0 (1)
In this paper, the elliptic curve p-256 in FIPS Pub 186-3
is suggested as an appropriate elliptic curve in the improved
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TABLE 1. Symbols and definitions.
protocol [19]. The base point G = (Gx , Gy), the value of a,
b, p and the order r of G are given in Federal Information
Processing Standards (FIPS) Pub 186-3.
2) ELLIPTIC CURVE DIFFIE-HELLMAN
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) is an anonymous key
agreement protocol that allows two parties, each of which
having an elliptic curve public-private key pair, to estab-
lish a shared secret over an insecure channel [20]. Assume
that two communicating participators A and B possess their
own private keys SKA and SKB separately. SKA and SKB
are random integers chosen from the set {1, . . . , r − 1}.
According to private keys, the public keys PKA and PKB can
be calculated by the base point G of the elliptic curve:
PKA = SKA × G, PKB = SKB × G (2)
Where × is the scalar multiplication of G by an integer.
In this key establishment protocol, A and B exchange their
public keys and compute (xk , yk ) by the public key from their
opposite side, i.e., A casts (xk , yk ) = SKA × PKB and B casts
(xk , yk ) = SKB×PKA. Therefore, two communicating parties
hold the shared key xk locating at the X coordinate of the
point.
B. SECURITY MODEL
1) Communicating Parties. The improved protocol is
executed by the following two parties through an
untrusted channel.
• SDF middle device. The SDF middle device
lies in the infrastructure layer. It is usually
a computationally-limited devices such as a
router or a smart phone.
• SDF controller. The SDF controller lies in the
control layer. It is much more powerful than the
middle device.
2) Attack Model. We specify the attacker has the
following abilities.
• The attacker can observe, alter, delay or delete
messages transmitted between the coordinator and
sensor.
3) Security Goals. Under the above attacker model, secu-
rity goals of the Unbalanced OpenFunction handshake
protocol are listed as follows.
• Authentication. After a completed run of the
protocol, both the controller and middle device can
confirm the received messages are sent by the true
communicating parties.
• Confidentiality. The session key MK is only
known by the controller and middle device in this
session.
• Key freshness. The session keyMK is fresh.
• Forward secrecy. When a long-term key is
compromised, previous session keys that were
established using this long-term key should not be
compromised.
IV. UNBALANCED OPENFUNCTION PROTOCOL
To achieve the improvements for [9] presented in section
II, we propose an Unbalanced OpenFunction handshake
protocol. This protocol is applied to improve handshake
of OpenFunction protocol, which is essential for further
updating process.
A. OVERVIEW OF PROTOCOL
Fig.3 illustrates the processes of setting up a secure connec-
tion between OpenFunction device and controller for later
transmission of update files. The notations of messages
involved in the protocol, which is shown in Fig.3, are
explained as follows:
• SYN: It is a TCP synchronize message. The SDFmiddle
device initiates a TCP connection by sending the SYN
message to the SDF controller.
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FIGURE 3. Process of Unbalanced OpenFunction protocol.
• ACK: It is a TCP acknowledge message. After the SDF
controller receives the ACK message from the SDF
middle device, the TCP connection is established.
• OF_HELLO: It is a message text that is used for version
negotiation when a connection is established.
• OF_FEATURE_REQUEST: The feature request
possessed by the SDF controller is applied for requiring
feature of the device.
• OF_FEATURE_REPLY: SDF middle device owns
feature reply and employs it on feature negotiation. Once
the device receives the feature request, the message of
feature reply containing the device capability report will
be transmitted to the controller.
As shown in Fig.3, the Unbalanced OpenFunction hand-
shake protocol proposed in this paper requires only 4 commu-
nications to finish handshake process, which is fewer than
7 communication steps of [9] exhibited in Fig.1.
B. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
Assume that controller and device share their ECC public
keys PKwith each other. PKD should be stored previously by
controller and PKC should be held by the device in advance.
The ECC private keys SK are only possessed by their owners
before initiation. Here we describe the protocol as follows.
1) D chooses a random number RD and computes UD:
UD = RD + SKD (3)
To exchange random number applied in key agreement,
D sends the following messageM1 to C .
M1 =< OF_HELLO,D,UD > (4)
2) C chooses a random number RC and computes UC :
UC = RC + SKC (5)
Then C generates TC by
TC = UC × G (6)
C sends messageM2 to D:
M2 =< OF_HELLO,C,TC > (7)
3) C computes provisional ECDH key KDH :
KDH = RC × (UD × G− PKD) (8)
Then C computes MAC1 as follows:
MAC1 = HAMC256
×(KDH_x ,M1||M2||featurerequest) (9)
C packs up MAC1 and feature request and sends
M3 to D:
M3 =< featurerequest,MAC1 > (10)
4) D computes its provisional ECDH key KDH by
KDH = RD × (TC − PKC ) (11)
Then D computes MAC1:
MAC1 = HAMC256
×(KDH_x2,M1||M2|| featurerequest) (12)
When D receives the message M3 from C , D verifies
whether its MAC1 is equivalent to C ′s. If verification
succeeds, D will identify C and mark master key MK
byMK=CMAC128(KDH_x1, C ||D). Next,D computes
MAC2:
MAC2 = HAMC256
×(KDH_x2,M1||M2||M3|| feature reply) (13)
Then D transmits feature reply andMAC2 packaged on
M4 to C :
M4 =< feature reply, MAC2 > (14)
5) C computesMAC ′2 according to its ECDH key KDH :
MAC2′ = HAMC256
(KDH_x2,M1||M2||M3|| feature reply) (15)
After receiving M4 from D, C verifies if MAC2 = MAC ′2.
If the verification executes successfully,C will identifyD and
mark master keyMK byMK = CMAC128(KDH_x1, C||D).
Note that D’s KDH computed in step 4 is equivalent to C’s
KDHgenerated in step 3, though their calculation procedures
vary. The formula derivation for proving equivalence of KDH
is described in Deduction 1 and 2.
In the result of deduction, RC and RD are the random
numbers exchanged by C and D during step 1 and 2 in
protocol. The commutative law is applicable to ECC scalar
multiplication [21], soKDH ofC andD are equivalent. There-
fore, the public key algorithm can be accomplished securely
based on the design of unbalanced computation.
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Deduction 1 C calculates KDH = RC × (UD × G− PKD)
KDH = RC × (UD × G− PKD) <known>
UD = RD + SKD <known>
PKD = SKD × G <known>
UD × G = (RD + SKD)× G = RD × G+ PKD < 2, 3 >
UD × G− PKD = RD × G < 4 >
KDH = RC × RD × G < 1, 5 >
Deduction 2 D calculates KDH = RD × (TC − PKC )
KDH = RD × (TC − PKC ) <known>
TC = UC × G <known>
UC = RC + SKC <known>
PKC = SKC × G <known>
TC = (RC + SKC )× G = RC × G+ PKC < 2, 3, 4 >
TC − PKC = RC × G < 5 >
KDH = RD × RC × G = RC × RD × G < 1, 6 >
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Section III lists the security goals that our protocol is
supposed to achieve. This section presents security analysis of
our protocol, and illustrates how the goals are achieved. In this
section, wewill analyze the security of our protocol according
to the security model in Section III.C. We first rewrite the
definition of security goals through Proposition 1, 2, 3 and 4.
Then, we prove how these propositions stand.
A. AUTHENTICATION
Proposition 1: After a completed run of the new protocol, D
can confirm OF_HELLO, C, TC and feature_request are sent
by C; C can confirm OF_HELLO, D, UD and feature_reply
are sent by D.
Proof (Sketch): First, authentication ofOF_HELLO,C , TC
and feature_request are guaranteed by MAC1. To compute
MAC1, KDH is required. Since KDH = RC × (UD × G −
PKD) = RD× (TC −PKC ), the party can calculate KDH only
when (RC , UD, PKD) or (RD, TC , PKC ) is known. Since RD
and RC are not transmitted directly in the protocol, purely
D and C hold the two values. That is, KDH can only be
calculated by D and C ; MAC1 can only be calculated by D
and C . Therefore, as long asMAC1 passes the verification of
step 4,OF_HELLO,C , TC and feature_request are sent byC .
Second, authentication of OF_HELLO, D, UD and
feature_reply are guaranteed byMAC2. The analysis is similar
as above.
B. CONFIDENTIALITY
Proposition 2: After a completed run of the improved
protocol, the new shared session key MK is only known by C
and D.
Proof (Sketch): As we proved in Proposition 1, KDH can
only be calculated by C and D. Thus, merely Cand D are
aware ofMK = CMAC128(KDH_x1,C||D).
C. KEY FRESHNESS
Proposition 3: After a completed run of the improved
protocol, both C and D can confirm that MK is fresh.
Proof (Sketch): Both C and D compute MK as MK =
CMAC128(KDH_x1, C ||D). KDH involves two random values
RC and RD generated by C and D. Since random values are
fresh in each protocol session, both C andD can confirm that
KDH is fresh. Consequently, both C and D can confirm the
freshness ofMK.
D. FORWARD SECRECY
Proposition 4. Assume the attacker compromises long term
secret keys SKDand SKC . The attacker is unable to compro-
mise previous session keys established using SKD and SKC .
Proof (Sketch): Since MK = CMAC128(KDH_x1,C||D)
and KDH = RC × (UD × G − PKD) = RD × (TC − PKC ),
computing the previous session key requires the random
values RC or RD in that session. Only with SKD and SKC ,
the adversary is unable to compute KDH in previous sessions.
Hence, it can be confirmed that the improved protocol
provides forward secrecy.
VI. PERFORMANCE
To observe the performance of the proposed protocol,
we evaluate the computation and communication cost theo-
retically. In addition, a set of experiments are carried out to
test protocol’s performance.
A. THEORETICAL EVALUATION
Denote the message transmitted in communication by M,
the algorithm HMAC by H, the operation of ECC scalar
multiplication by S, the operation of ECC point subtraction
by R. In Table 2, we have evaluated the communication
and computation cost of both sides, i.e. C and D, on the
recommended protocol.
Based on Table 2, we are able to draw following conclu-
sions.
• Communication costs of the unbalanced OpenFunction
protocol are acceptable. The total communication costs
are 4M and the number of messages transmitted by the
middle device is equal to the controller. Practically the
communication on C might be more lightweight than
that on D while the controller is more powerful than the
device.
• Computing costs of the improved protocol are accept-
able. The total computing cost is 4S + 2R + 6H, but
the computation of two sides is asymmetric. We can
conclude from the data that the computational load on
the device is lower than that on the controller because the
computing cost of the device is less than the controller by
2S. The performance is adequate for capability-limited
devices.
B. EXPERIMENT
To verify the above results, we design several experi-
ments deploying the protocol suite to test the performance.
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TABLE 2. Evaluation of the unbalanced OpenFunction protocol’s cost.
TABLE 3. Details about the experiment devices.
TABLE 4. Average runtime (in second) of computing in the protocol for
different curves.
FIGURE 4. Average runtime (in second) of computing in the protocol for
different curves. The protocol requires an asymmetrical computational
load on C and D.
The controller is allocated on a laptop and the middle device
is configured on a Raspberry Pi. More details of experiment
environment are illuminated in Table 3. The protocol suite
realizes the unbalanced OpenFunction protocol. HMAC is
implemented with the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) 256.
According to the recommendation of FIPS Pub 186-3 [19],
we implement the ECDH algorithm by several suggested
curves, i.e. Curve P-192, P-224, P-256, and P-384.
We ran the protocol suite with each curve for 10 times.
The average runtime of computing in each curve’s experi-
ments is shown in Table 4 and Fig.4. Additionally, all data
about the average runtime of communication is illustrated
TABLE 5. Average runtime (in second) of communication in the protocol
for different curves.
in Table 5. The value in Table 4 and Table 5 presents that the
average runtime ofC andD increases as the bit length of ECC
generated key increases. The length of ECC key is relative to
its elliptic curve, i.e. each element of generated key pair on
Curve P-192 retains the length of 192 bit. Fig.4 reveals that
the difference in performance between controller and device
is prominent. In all cases of Fig.4, the computational burden
on the Raspberry Pi is lower than that on the laptop. It is
known that the computing power of the laptop is much higher
than the Raspberry Pi, so the modified protocol substantially
reduces computing burden on D.
VII. RELATED WORK
In this section, we provide a brief overview of some related
researchwork; and do theoretical or experimental comparison
between them and the unbalanced OpenFunction protocol.
A. OVERVIEW OF RELATED WORK
There are two previous generations of the Unbalanced Open-
Function handshake protocol sketchily introduced in the
following.
Xue et al. [9] have introduced an intelligent building frame-
work called S2Net, which is based on Software Defined
Networking (SDN) architecture. The two protocols of S2Net
are the origin of OpenFunction protocol. The first is to
initialize connection, authenticate communicating parties and
negotiate session key. The second is to transmit messages
encrypted and decrypted by session key. The process of first
protocol is descried in Fig.2.
In [8], Xue et al. propose a new architecture named Soft-
ware Defined Function (SDF) derived from SDN. Instead of
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TABLE 6. Feature comparison of proposed protocol and its predecessors (‘‘
√
’’ denotes the protocol possesses the feature, and ‘‘×’’ denotes the protocol
does not own this feature).
TABLE 7. Comparison of authentication in remote system update or device firmware update of function stations operated on several mainstream mobile
operating systems and remote reprogramming of the proposed protocol.
OpenFlow only providing packet forwarding across switches
in SDN, OpenFunction protocol is presented for remote
updating of IoT devices. As the improvement of S2Net, Open-
Function finishes authenticated handshake within 4 steps
in first part and then messages updating files in second part.
However, [8] only advances conception and overview of
OpenFunction except protocol description and detail.
Furthermore, SSL and TLS are traditional standard proto-
cols aimed to ensure security of HTTP and other Internet
applications. As shown in Table 7, SSL and TLS are widely
applied for remote system updating of common operating
systems, such as Windows, Debian, iOS and Android.
B. COMPARISON
The comparison in accordance with features of the proposed
protocol and its predecessors, i.e. [8], [9], is listed in Table 6.
Differing with these two protocols, based on ECC algorithm,
the unbalanced OpenFunction protocol can directly complete
authentication without the secret key before beginning.
Therefore, it does not require the two sides to exchange and
store secret keys by specific channels or clipper chips. While
the other two protocols spend balanced computational cost
on both sides, the protocol recommended in this paper adopts
unbalanced computation to reduce the burden on the devices
with limited computing capacity.
In addition, in terms of authentication, we compare this
protocol with the remote system update or Device Firmware
Update (DFU) of many current schemes in several kinds
of mobile operating systems, such as Windows and Debian
in PCs, as well as Android and iOS in mobile phones, and
conclude the comparative results in Table 7. According to the
hash algorithms listed in Table 7, we can recognize that SHA-
1 is adopted in digital signature or key fingerprint of most of
the remote system upgrade, and yet the Debian system and
the proposed protocol utilize a famous member of the SHA-
2 family, SHA-256. However, the SHA-1 algorithm was offi-
cially deprecated by NIST in 2011 [22] because of its dubious
security. Moreover, SHA-1 is suggested to be replaced with
SHA-2 algorithm family by SSL Labs [23]. Thus, the defen-
siveness of the improved protocol is perhaps higher than
those comparative protocols. According to Wander’s state-
ment [24], the benefits of ECC over RSA are less compu-
tation, less transmitted data and shorter secret key in same
encryption strength so that energy and communication cost
can be saved significantly.Therefore, the proposed protocol
authenticated by ECC is more qualified than any other
approaches encrypted by RSA to the power-limited and
memory-bound devices that act as middle devices. The
unbalanced computational cost of the protocol is also a
specific advantage in diminishing devices’ burden.
Moreover, we also implement the secure handshake
process of updating schemes used by Windows, Debian,
iOS and Android, i.e. SSL handshake and TLS handshake,
and compare their performance with our protocol. In our
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TABLE 8. Average runtime (in second) of communication in SSL
handshake and TLS handshake process.
FIGURE 5. Average runtime (in second) of device’s and total computing
time in SSL handshake and the unbalanced OpenFunction protocol.
proposed protocol, we assume that C and D have exchanged
their public key before OpenFunction handshake. There-
fore, in order to test data more veritably and equitably,
we eliminate the time of producing and exchanging Certifi-
cate Authority (CA) and employ ECDH algorithm to achieve
ECC encryption in the experiments of SSL 3.0 protocol and
TLS 1.2 protocol. In the experiment, we test the runtime
of SSL on C and D in the same experimental environment
listed in Table 3. We also run SSL handshake and TLS
handshake with ECDH algorithm on curves P-256 and P-
384 for 10 times; and the results are presented in Table 8.
Furthermore, the average computing runtime of device in SSL
handshake, TLS handshake and the unbalanced OpenFunc-
tion protocol are compared in Fig.5. From this figure, we can
conclude that the proposed protocol enables devices to run
much faster than devices executing SSL handshake or TLS
handshake. In this fair situation, the total controller runtime
of P-256 and P-384 in the unbalanced OpenFunction protocol
are about 0.0982s and 0.1914s respectively, which are less
than 0.2406s and 0.2650s in SSL handshake and also shorter
than 0.2455s and 0.2687s in TLS handshake. Therefore,
the unbalanced OpenFunction protocol can practically
reduce computing cost of devices and achieve better effi-
ciency of handshake than SSL and TLS. In addition, obser-
vations of Fig.5 suggest that the runtime of TLS is slightly
longer than SSL in both curves. Therefore, SSL is more suit-
able to pursue greater efficiency. As the differences between
SSL and TLS explained by Thomas [33], since TLS can
FIGURE 6. SDF-based PV energy system. (a) OpenFunction
reprogramming system. (b) PV system.
operate standardized MAC (HMAC) with not only MD5 and
SHA but also any other hash function, TLS provides more
flexible selections to developers.
VIII. USE CASE
As in the previous description, our unbalanced OpenFunction
protocol has a significant strength on lessening the computa-
tional load of function stations during wireless reprogram-
ming, which is advanced in some applications of wireless
sensor network. In this section, we illuminate the usage
improved by our protocol through a use case named SDF-
based photovoltaic (PV) energy system. Traditional schemes
apply SSL or TLS in building reliable connection for trans-
mission, the middle device in this PV system is less powerful
and may spend too much cost to reach the standard runtime
in industry. Furthermore, many actual solar energy companies
have high requirements in timeliness in data transmission
of PV panels. However, slow or even overburdened middle
device might cause the consequence that statistical accuracy
of data becomes beyond reasonable range. Therefore, this
use case employs the improved protocol into SDF-based PV
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TABLE 9. Details about the devices in SDF-based PV energy system.
energy system to reduce computing cost in middle device and
improve efficiency of updating. The protocol updates Direct
Current/Direct Current (DC/DC) converter algorithm from
remote servers to the DC/DC converter. In addition, the ECC
algorithm used in the improved protocol requires two sides to
store shorter secret key, which has the advantage in memory-
bound devices like DC/DC converter.
According to control algorithm in DC/DC converter,
the direct current generated by PV panels can be converted
from a higher input voltage to an adequate output voltage that
can be accepted by a variety of middle devices. By utilizing
the improved protocols of SDF, the PV energy systems can
securely upgrade the DC/DC converter algorithm through
wireless links. The SDF-based PV panel system involves
the following three phases, and our improved protocol is
included in the first step. The demo system is realized as
shown in Fig.6, and the details about the experiment devices
are itemized in Table 9.
1) Establishing communication. The remote server
(such as a laptop) and the middle device (such as a
Raspberry Pi) execute the Unbalanced OpenFunction
handshake protocol to build a communication channel.
As a result, a relative master key is shared between each
other.
2) Transmitting update files. To transmit update files
from the server to the middle device, these two
devices execute the extended OpenFunction messaging
protocol of SDF so that the middle device can receive
new algorithm files.
3) Reprogramming end devices. The middle device
reprograms the end devices (i.e. the DC/DC converter)
by the update files.
Note that the DC load consumes energy and can be used to
measure the output voltage, and the Buck converter is recog-
nized as a DC/DC converter in the demo system. Although
the Raspberry Pi, as a middle device, is a less capable device
compared with a normal laptop, the Unbalanced OpenFunc-
tion handshake protocol in the first step reduces the computa-
tional cost of the middle device. The unbalanced computing
cost strategy enhances the efficiency of the SDF-based PV
energy system.
IX. CONCLUSION
At present, wireless updating has been widely and frequently
used in IoT applications for system upgrade or device
firmware update. In addition to SSL protocol and TSL
protocol which are applied for most mobile devices, Open-
Function protocol based on SDF can support IoT devices to
build secure communications with servers and accept new
system files. After that, these devices can execute the system
files to update their sensors by some WSN reprogramming
methods. In OpenFunction protocol, handshake process is
to guarantee communication security of wireless updating.
The OpenFunction handshake requires equal computation
cost on both sides. However, in fact, computing powers
of devices and controllers are different. The OpenFunc-
tion protocol ignores the advantage that servers possessing
high computing capability can share computational work of
devices so as to reduce devices’ burden. Therefore, bymaking
use of this advantage, this paper has proposed an unbal-
anced OpenFunction protocol to decrease devices’ compu-
tational load and improve efficiency of OpenFunction hand-
shake. In comparison with original protocol, the unbalanced
OpenFunction protocol completes handshake process with
fewer steps and distribute less load on device by allocating
unbalanced computation tasks in two sides. The proposed
protocol also demands no secret key as precondition and
firstly secures authentication with ECC algorithm. Moreover,
after implementing and testing in same experimental envi-
ronment, we concluded that the unbalanced OpenFunction
protocol has better performance than SSL handshake and
TLS handshake, and it assuredly reduces much computing
cost of device. Thus, the proposed protocol is particularly
suitable for not only the use case exemplified in Section 7 but
also IoT access control applications, such as smart lock
systems or intelligent door security systems, to efficiently
secure their wireless communication for system update.
In the future, we plan to carry out experiments of whole
wireless updating process including message transmission,
and test the performance with different ECC curves. More-
over, we will deploy our protocol in large scale WSNs to test
its performance.
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